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Abstract
This article explores the lights of Iraq, Iraq's variety of capitalism (VoC) and its system of public
and fiscal governance. The first section examines Iraq's VoC, which I define oil-led state-captured
capitalism with  associated  oil-led  state-captured  war-fare  regime.  In  formerly  ISIS-occupied
territories, war developments turned the system into an Insurgent ISIS-captured capitalism with
associated Insurgent ISIS-captured war-fare regime.  The second section investigates electricity
usage.  The  nighttime  lights  analysis  is based  on  near  real-time  big  data.  It  includes  high-
resolution remote-sensing  and  satellite  imagery  from the  NASA Earth  Observatory.  I  use  the
Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor on the Suomi NPP satellite. Data on
greenhouse  gases  are  obtained  through  the  AQUA and  TERRA satellites  derived  from  the
Atmospheric  Infrared  Sounder  (AIRS)  and  Moderate-resolution  Imaging  Spectroradiometer
(MODIS) sensors. I also use the AURA satellite with the Ozone Monitoring Instrument (OMI)
sensor, as well as the  TERRA satellite with the Measurements of Pollution in the Troposphere
(MOPITT)  sensor.  The  third  part  examines  the  repercussions  of  electricity  usage  for  good
governance, for good regulatory and good fiscal practices, as well as for development and growth.
The concluding part briefly discusses the “taxman approach” and the introduction of a new fiscal
contract necessary to resolve negative incentives in oil-led war economies.
KEYWORDS: Iraq,  political  economy,  ISIS, geo-spatial  analysis,  night lights,  remote-sensing,
satellite imagery, public governance, fiscal governance,  oil-led state-captured capitalism, oil-led
state-captured war-fare regime, state capture, policy capture.
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Introduction
Since the advent of the Saddam Hussein regime and, subsequent, first Gulf War of 1980-1988,
Iraq underwent a difficult transition to democracy which has been characterized by the emergence
of civil conflicts and system instability. The second Gulf War in 1991, the international economic
sanctions during the period 1991–2003, and the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 did not
succeed  to  resolve  the  internal  problems,  but  have  often  exacerbated  pre-existing  ethnic  and
religious tensions. This difficult transition to democracy has resulted in an increasing number of
casualties, which, from 2003 to 2011, have amounted to (publicly displayed) no less than 400,000
individuals and 4.5 million orphans (MIT 2018)1. However, the real number of deaths is estimated
to be much higher than the one reported by official statistics. Overall, thes same considerations
apply to the number of violent attacks which have increased significantly since the beginning of
the conflict.
In 2018, Iraq had an estimated population of approximately 39 million inhabitants. About
75-80  percent  are  Arabs,  whilst  the  remaining  15-20  percent  are  of  Kurdish  Turkoman  and
Assyrian origins. The Kurdish minority lives for the most part in northeastern Iraq (Kurdistan
Regional Government, henceforth KRG). Islam is the official religion and accounts for almost 95-
98 percent of the population. Shia Muslims correspond to 64-69 percent of the total population.
Sunni Muslims to approximately 29-34 percent. The remaining population is made of Christians
(about 1 percent), Hindus, Buddhists, Jewish, and people not affiliated to the above mentioned
religions2.
Electoral engineering (Sartori 1994) has been key for the Iraqi transition to democracy,
whose main goal has been to reduce the power of the Shiite majority, expanding the representation
of the Sunnis. The intended consequence, most clearly expressed in the Iraq Study Group report of
2006  and  in  the  18  benchmarks  of  2007,  was  to  speeding  up  the  de-baathification  process.
Simultaneously,  it  was  supposed  to  limit  the  incentives  for  violence  and  sectarian  conflict
(Haggard and Long 2007, p. 2).
In order to bring democracy back to the table after decades of authoritarian subjugation,
attempts at creating a more representative territorial structure have been made by national and
international authorities. A proportional system of electoral representation was introduced after the
fall of the Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. As a consequence, since the first elections in 2005,
1 MIT (2018), Iraq: The Human Cost of War. http://web.mit.edu/humancostiraq/ (accessed 19 
May 2018). 
2 CIA World Factbook (2018)
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html (accessed  19  May
2018). 
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several  different  lists  of  independent  candidates  (almost  36  in  the  elections  of  2014)  have
emerged.  The first  free elections were held in 2005 and were characterized by the victory of
President Jalal Talabani and of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (6 April 2005). Both candidates
were re-elected in the polls of May 20, 2006. Mr Talabani, of Kurdish origin, represented, for the
first phase of transition, the most prominent figure of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Mr al-
Maliki represented, instead, the leading figure of the Shia leading coalition ‘State of Law’. In the
elections of 2014, Mr al-Maliki was re-elected as Prime Minister but was replaced in 2016 by the
Shiite politician Haider al-Abadi3. Mr Fuad Masum, also of Kurdish origins, became instead the
new President (Al-Jazeera 2014; Wikipedia 2015). In the national elections of 2018, 87 parties and
6,990 candidates tried to acquire a seat in the Iraq's parliament (Ibrahim 2018a,b).  This was the
result  of  the political  fragmentation caused by the subsequent  waves  of  war.  The Shia leader
Muqtada al-Sadr  of the Sairoon Alliance won the parliamentary elections  with 54 seats.  Shia
militia chief Hadi al-Amiri of Fatah (Conquest) Bloc obtained 47 seats. Former Prime Minister
Haider al-Abadi of Nasr (Victory) Coalition obtained 42 seats (Al-Jazeera 2018; The Baghdad
Post 2018a). Elections' results were soon subjected to disputes.
Close to the announced defeat of ISIS (Mansour 2017), the unity of all Iraqis4, the fight
against  corruption  (داPPسف [fasad])  became  one  of  the  main  mobilization  strategies  of  the  2018
national elections. The fight against corruption also represented the main keyword for identity
politics (Shia,  Sunni,  Kurds,  etc.),  civicness, public authority,  as well  as for good governance
(IRIS  2018).  Here,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  fight  against  “The  Corrupt”  (نيدPPسافلا [al-
fāsideen]), seen as bad as ISIS (Mansour 2017),  also includes religious normative connotations,
such as those concerned with religious “immorality” (روجف [fajur]) and moral decay (يقلخلا للحنلا
[alanhalal alakhlaki]). It does not simply refer to the “unprincipled” (ئداPبملا نPم درPجم [mjrd min
almabadi]),  “corruptible”  (داPPسفلاو ةوPPشرلل لPPباق [qabil  lilrashwat  walfasad]),  “purchasable”  (ءارPPشلل
[lilshira']), “dishonest” (نيمأ ريغ [ghyr 'amin], etc. individual.
In the light of a persistent electoral fragmentation of the political spectrum, Haggard and
Long  (2007,  p.  3)  have  identified  in  the  ‘engineer’s  dilemma’ a  critical  situation  for  future
stabilization and consolidation attempts in Iraq.  The ‘engineer’s dilemma’ refers to a situation
where  the  presumed  institutional  change  aimed  at  enlarging  the  representation  of  the  Sunni
3 The Washington Post (2014), Iraqi president names Haider al-Abadi new prime minister,  defying al-
Maliki.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iraqs-political-situation-dire-as-maliki-digs-
in/2014/08/11/1c70942a-213a-11e4-958c-268a320a60ce_story.html (accessed 19 May 2018). 
4 On a tweet on May 2018, the Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr stated: “Iraqi people are twins in 
faith and brothers in Islam, nation and life [...] No more Kurdish demand for secession, no 
more Sunni calls for revenge and no more Shiite fighting. Unity, tolerance and peace are our 
target” (The Baghdad Post 2018b).
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minority has ended up in an unexpected increase of violence. Among the problems of political
inclusion  associated  with  this  failure  in  constitutional  and  electoral  engineering,  the  authors
mention ‘the  fragmentation of the combatants, their weak representation in the formal political
process, and the presence of extremists and the associated process of outbidding’ (Haggard and
Long 2007, p. 3). The fiscal and federal structure, which continues to favor the two major allies
(Shia and Kurds), also played a dominant role in reducing the prospects for peace and stability.
Interestingly, always according to the authors (see Haggard and Long 2007, p. 8), these problems
of ‘engineering’ have contributed to exacerbate the demands of radical nationalists to re-establish
a Sunni hegemony, and increasing the jihadists’ requests for an Islamic ‘caliphate’. 
An additional important and often neglected issue of Iraq's political system concerns the
increasing autonomy of the Kurdistan National Assembly, which also thanks to the number of
seats (111) and the relative power of the Kurdish minority,  makes it  de facto an autonomous
regional state or, in other words, a ‘state within a state’ (UNPO 2013). This has clear repercussions
not only for Iraq’s future national unity and long-term stability, but also for future redistributive
attempts and associated distributive conflicts (see Haggard and Kaufman 2016). The territorial
distribution of natural resources in the contemporary federal structure continues to favor existing
winning coalitions,  not avoiding the creation of insider-outsider  divides.  The limits  of such a
constructed ‘consociational democracy’, aptly highlighted by Lijphardt (1999), have become in
this way more apparent (Haggard and Long 2007, p. 12). This can also be seen in the formulation
of the new constitution, which, adopted by a referendum on 15 October 2005 (amended in 2013),
has  established  a  mixed  legal  system  of  civil  and  Islamic  law,  still  subjected  to  multiple
interpretations5.  The challenge for the international community at large is, therefore, to promote
new forms of ‘culturally sensitive capitalism’,  able to integrate and to pacify different hostile
factions of the society. The number of firms must increase, but also the human security and the
economic integration of the affected population must do. In order to achieve these objectives,
there is a need for a new political economy with new distributive and fiscal priorities.
This article explores the lights of Iraq, Iraq's variety of capitalism (VoC) and its system of
public and fiscal governance. The first section examines Iraq's VoC, which I define oil-led state-
captured capitalism with  associated  oil-led  state-captured  war-fare  regime.  In  formerly ISIS-
occupied  territories,  war  developments  turned the  system  into  an Insurgent  ISIS-captured
capitalism  with  associated  Insurgent  ISIS-captured  war-fare  regime.  The  second
5According to the Arab Barometer for Iraq (2012, p.5), about 72 percent of respondents agree that
‘religious practices should be kept as a private matter and separated from public life’, 85 percent
that  ‘religious  leaders  should  not  interfere  in  voters’ decisions’,  whilst  only  31  percent  that
‘Islamic law was appropriate for their country’.
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section investigates electricity usage. The nighttime lights analysis is based on near real-time big
data.  It  includes  high-resolution remote-sensing  and  satellite  imagery  from  the  NASA Earth
Observatory. I use the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor on the Suomi
NPP satellite. Data on greenhouse gases are obtained through the AQUA and TERRA satellites
derived  from  the  Atmospheric  Infrared  Sounder  (AIRS)  and  Moderate-resolution  Imaging
Spectroradiometer (MODIS) sensors. I also use the AURA satellite with the Ozone Monitoring
Instrument (OMI) sensor,  as well as the TERRA satellite with the Measurements of Pollution in
the Troposphere (MOPITT) sensor. The third part examines the repercussions of electricity usage
for good governance, for good regulatory and good fiscal practices, as well as for development
and growth. The concluding part briefly discusses the “taxman approach” and the introduction of a
new fiscal contract necessary to resolve negative incentives in oil-led war economies.
The Political Economy in Iraq 
Iraq’s main development model remains heavily based on oil revenues and state transfers, which
take the form of public subsidies, employment in the public sector and transfers to state-owned
enterprises (World Bank 2014). Iraq's variety of capitalism (see Hall and Soskice 2001) can be
described as an oil-led state-captured capitalism, subjected to well-known distributive “resource
curse” problems (Ross 2012), including a resource predation and a resource-seeking foreign direct
investment dependence mechanism (Stevens et al. 2015). I describe this:  oil-led state-captured
capitalism with  associated  oil-led state-captured war-fare regime (see  Esping-Andersen  1990;
Gough  et  al.  2004; Cerami  and  Stubbs  2013).  In  formerly  ISIS-occupied  territories,  war
developments  turned  the  system  into  an  Insurgent  ISIS-captured  capitalism  with  associated
Insurgent ISIS-captured war-fare regime. 
In 2012, the total budget revenues at disposal of the government corresponded to 102,327
billion Iraqi Dinars (ID), among which 94,378 billion ID came from oil revenues and 2,840 ID
billion  from taxes6.  Individuals  paid  a  very  small  amount  of  taxes,  as  the  majority  of  state
revenues and public services was financed through oil (World Bank 2014, Table 2.1, p.20). In
2016, oil revenues accounted to more than 90 percent of total revenues, whilst taxes amounted to
only 2 percent. Income tax, corporate income tax, taxes on goods and services, property taxes and
taxes on international  trade were below the MENA region of 10 percent and an international
comparator average of 15 percent (Feher et al. 2017, p. 16-19). In absence of a clear involvement
of  citizens  in  financing  their  own  state  and  system of  public  governance,  electoral  requests
become easily a gift of the political elites to ‘their’ citizens (Diamond 2008). In 2017, because of
6 In June 2012, 1 USD corresponded to 1166 Iraqi dinars.
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the economic recession following the protracted reduction in oil and gas prices, of war-fare related
activities, as well as of ongoing political contestation and civil conflicts due to the ISIS presence
(OECD 2016a), Iraq's GDP corresponded to 230.7 trillion IQDs (-0.8 percent in comparison to the
previous year), of which oil GDP was equal to 87.3 trillion IQDs (-3.5 percent) and non-oil GDP
to 143.4 trillion IQDs (4.4 percent) (World Bank 2018, Table 56, p. 128)7. 
In  2018,  ten  main  transmission  mechanisms  of  economic  and  fiscal  crises  could  be
identified in Iraq: (i) trade shocks; (ii) oil prices and oil price cycles shocks; (iii) exchange rate
shocks; (iv) banking sector risks; (v) foreign direct investments shocks; and (vi) debt refinincing
squeeze (that is - dependency on foreign financial markets for debt refinancing; see Stubbs et al.
2009). In addition,  (vii) corruption, (viii) “oil resource curse”, (ix) state-capture and (x) policy-
capture (OECD  2017a,b)8 related mechanisms also played a crucial role in the transmission of
economic and fiscal crises. 
War-fare amenities with associated damages (see World Bank 2018) also continue to create
significant  macro-  and  micro-  economic  vulnerabilities.  They  also  alter  the  main  sources  of
financing for  public  expenditures,  subsequently,  reducing the fiscal  space available  for  public
policies.  Furthermore,  they  also  exacerbate  the  problems  associated  with  the  international
competitiveness of Iraq. 
The Political Economy of War in Formerly ISIS-occupied Territories
In formerly ISIS-occupied territories9,  almost one-third of Iraq (Mansour 2017), close to war-
making activities, ISIS established a “war economy” based on resource predation. As introduced
by Eaton (2018, p. 5), “the term ‘war economy’ encompasses economic activities dependent –
directly or  indirectly – on the  dispensation  or  perpetuation of  violence”  put  in  place  by  war
economy profiteers.  This  includes  war-making  income-generating  activities,  among which  the
acquisition of state assets of captured cities, smuggling (including the sale of commodities, goods,
7 In 2017, 1 USD corresponded to 1,171 Iraqi dinars. 
8 The term “state capture”, derived from the concept of “regulatory capture”, refers to the ways in
which private  individuals capture state bureacracies (including formal  and informal  norms) to
manipulate public policy-making, including their ideas, interests and institutions (see Hall 1993),
for their private interest (World Bank 2000, p. 3). The term “policy capture” refers, instead, to
“public decisions over policies [that] are consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public
interest towards a specific interest” (OECD 2017b, p. 1).
9 For  recent  maps,  see  2016  ISIS-occupied  territories  available  here,
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/10/this-map-shows-how-much-territory-isis-has-lost-in-
2016/ and 2017 map available here https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/GA224615/Islamic-State-
will-prepare-for-the-next-phase (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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services,  humans and parts  of  humans),  extortion,  taxation,  and rents  (e.g.  land rents)  (Eaton
2018). In 2017, the main sources of financing the ISIS self-proclaimed state and war-fare regime
included oil, natural gas, phosphate, cement, agriculture, revenues of criminal origin, extortion,
kidnap and ransom, antiquities trafficking and donations (Swanson 2015; CAT 2016), which were
redistributed  among  the  population  to  acquire  legitimacy  and  support  (Almukhtar  2015;
Callimachi 2018).  This  “caliphate-building” activity also implied the creation of its  own ISIS
currency (Milliken 2015). 
In June 2014, ISIS’ estimated assets in Iraq corresponded to no less than $875 million. Its
major revenue sources were given by extortion and taxation activities in the Iraqi territory, which
were estimated at $600 million. In addition, $500 million were stolen from state-owned banks,
$100 million from oil whose barrels were sold at half of the official price. $20 million were raised
by kidnapping ransoms (Almukhtar 2015). 
In 2015, ISIS expanded increasing its  “public policy investment” in people,  paying its
20,000-30,000 fighters between $350 and $1500 per month according to their rank, skills and
nationality (FATF 2015, pp. 29-30). Similar estimations made by Lister (2015) stated that there
were approximately 30,000 ISIS armed members in early 2015, and about a half of these were
foreigners  of  not  Iraqi  or  Syrian  origin. The  ISIS  total  assets,  presumably  including  also  the
occupied territories in Syria, should have, in reality, corresponded to $2 billion, with an annual
revenue of $200 million to $300 million (Waterbury 2015). 
In 2016, ISIS oil revenues were estimated to range from $250 million per year to nearly
$365 million per year. However, these numbers declined due to the airstrikes on tanks and oil
refineries (Jones et al 2017, p.8)10. Between 2016 and 2017, ISIS money for funding the ISIS war-
fare regime also came from stealing and redistributing credit cards, social security benefits, small
loans, scooters, or even selling organs of dead fighters (for more information on such disgusting
business, see also FATF 2017; May 2017). As in other countries, selling weapons was also used as
a corruption mechanism (see Enough Project 2017), which was then re-employed for increasing
the performance of the ISIS war-fare state. 
At the end of 2017, daily commerce and agriculture (worth hundreds of million of dollars)
rather than external donor or oil sales represented the main sources of funding for the ISIS new tax
revenue regime (Callimachi 2018).  Between 2014 and 2017, ISIS established  at  least  14 new
administrative offices named “diwan” (including education, health, etc.) (Callimachi 2018). The
10 Up-to-date information on ISIS financing mechanisms, including wage salaries, is provided by
Jones et al. (2017).
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term diwan stems from the Sultan of Sulu Sharif ul-Hashim's (who lived approximately in 1405)
system of laws based on Quran11. The  diwans  established by Sharif ul-Hashim can therefore be
understood  as  the  administrative  and  bureacratic  expressions  of  a  Quran's  interpretation  of  a
caliphate tax financing system. In ISIS-occupied territories, local administrators are understood
not  as  the  owners  of  the  land,  but  their  protectors  (Maulana,  e.g.  the  Sultan)  –  and  their
administrators (the Sheiks).
Hence, the distrinction between direct and indirect taxation in “Islamic State” territories is,
to some extent, misleading, since taxes should rather be seen as “religious endowments” paid for
the individuals'  benefiting of goods and services. In the new “tax farming” system12, taxes, or
“religious endowments” are important steering mechanisms13. They aim to change the behavior of
people and become functional to the establishment and maintenance of a “state/caliphate”14. 
Tax-steering or  religious  endowment-steering became,  in  this  case,  an important  social
mechanism  of  consonance-driven  desire  formation (Hedström  1998)  with ‘environmental’,
‘cognitive’,  as  well  as  ‘relational’  repercussions  (see  MacAdam  et  al. 2001).  Religious
endowments  have  an  impact  on  the  closest  surrounding  conditions  that  affect  the  lives  of
individuals, as well as their psychological and behavioural patterns, with associated connections
among people, groups and interpersonal networks (see also Mayntz 2003). This, consequently,
may lead to social mechanisms of anger mobilization and contagion in collective action.
These  religious  “taxes”  involved,  for  example,  financing  public  and  social  security
services, such as taxes for garbage collection, VAT, tariffs for trade, electricity, sanitation, fees for
social security services, tax subventions (such as for the sheep milk) or tax deductions, taxes from
oil  extraction,  land taxes  and poll  taxes,  taxes  on accessing the labour  market,  payroll  taxes,
personal  income  tax,  property  usage  contracts  and  associated  taxes  (e.g.  concession  tax),
withholding taxes, price subsidies, custom duties, and landholder taxes. In formerly ISIS-occupied
territories, even bus tickets were part of the overall tax financing system regime, since they helped
to fund the functioning of municipal local social security services15. 
11 The original name of  Sharif ul-Hashim was Sayyed walShareef Abubakar Abirin AlHashmi,
which shows that he was supposed to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.
12 On tax-farming in Muslim societies, see Rothstein and Broms (2010) and Cerami (2015).
13 On steering mechanisms see Mayntz (2003).
14 In the bills and receipts it was written “The Islamic State, Caliphate on the path to prophecy”,
see  Callimachi  Twitter  Post  (2018a)  https://twitter.com/i/moments/983112616146071553
(accessed 19 May 2018). 
15 See Callimachi Twitter Post (2018b) https://twitter.com/i/moments/982358498863407104 
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The System of Public Governance in Iraq
The system of public governance in Iraq depends on oil revenues and on the attachment of citizens
to the labour  market  with  a  majority of  public  sector  employees  or,  when not  accessible,  on
informal  arrangements provided by the members of the family,  the tribe or the sect  (Shia vs.
Sunni).  In  order  to  protect  uncovered  citizens,  the  government  has  established  a  Public
Distribution System based on state-sponsored fuel subsidies16 and food rations. The implications
of this system are, first of all, high dependence from state-driven labour market performance and
state-owned enterprises with a residual neo-liberal coverage for the non-employed, and, second,
dependence on food rations distributed to approximately 33 million Iraqis (about 90 percent of the
population) (El Mekkaoui de Freitas and Johnson 2012, p.9). The fiscal space for public policies,
therefore, greatly depends on oil revenues, oil prices and oil price cycles, as well as on the state-
budget availability of funds (Feher et al. 2017, p.11, 12). 
With regard to public governance and pensions, they rely on the social insurance principle,
which implies that only workers in formal employment have a decent access to retirement. Self-
employed persons, agricultural employees, temporary employees, household workers, and family
labour are excluded from pension entitlements (US Social Security Administration 2016). Due to
the high number of citizens employed in the public sector, near universal coverage aspirations
result  in  increasing  state  budget  inadequacies  and  low  protections  (Feher  et  al.  2017).  This
situation becomes particularly worrying in the case of disability and survivor pensions, especially
in a war-setting environment, where the presence of, for example, land-mines create an increasing
number of disabled citizens. The public distribution system is set to cover this deficit,  but, as
mentioned, it is often subjected to a lack of funds due to the drop in oil prices and adverse oil price
cycles.
Similarly, health care governance is based on health social insurance. This would imply
that in absence of state-sponsored provisions only employed persons would have access to heath
care services. Important to note is that subsequent wars in Iraq have destroyed most of the health
facilities  and this  has  resulted  in  a  lack  of  infrastructures,  medical  equipment,  personnel  and
medicines. As a report by UNOCHA (2015, p. 2) has shown, approximately 20 per cent of the
population (7 million people) cannot access even the most basic health care services, with women
(accessed 19 May 2018). 
16 From 2000 to 2016, oil, gasoline and kerosene prices for Iraqi families dramatically increased,
but energy price subsidies decreased from 7.7 percent of GDP in 2013 to 2.2 percent of GDP in
2016 (IMF 2017).
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and  children  particularly  vulnerable  to  poverty  related  diseases,  forced  marriage  and  sexual
violence. Public health emergency in Iraq requires the reestablishment of basic medical services,
especially in those areas occupied by armed groups where about 50 percent of health professionals
have fled17.
With regard to governance and protection against unemployment, jobs are mostly provided
by the state. Unemployment insurance covers only a small part of the population. Usually, this
involves those citizens who have worked in state owned enterprises and are attached to national
and local political elites. Interesting to note is that employment protection law dates back to 1964
(with subsequent amendments) and, therefore, it has been established in a period antecedent to
Saddam Hussein’s rise to power.  It  is based on a universal social  assistance principle, though
highly residual in scope and coverage (US Social Security Administration 2016).
Finally,  the  governance  of  maternity  and  family  benefits  are  also  based  on  the  social
insurance principle and, thus, covering only a very small part of Iraq's women. In absence of full
and  decent  employment,  women  continue  to  be  seen  as  wives-mothers  rather  than  active
participants in the labour market. This is also, to some extent, represented in the attitudes of Iraq's
population toward women. According to the Arab Barometer for Iraq (2012, p.28), approximately
72 percent of respondents state that ‘men and women should have equal work opportunities’, but
75 percent agreed that “men are better than women at political leadership”.
The System of Public Governance in Formerly ISIS-occupied Territories 
Drawing  on  Charles  Tilly’s  (1985)  seminal  work  entitled  War  Making  and  State  Making  as
Organized  Crime,  it  is  possible  to  affirm  that  the  functions  that  several  rebel  and  terrorist
organizations linked to ISIS carry out in their everyday lives (in particular, protective, extractive,
and redistributive) are equivalent to those of a state and, therefore, turn the organization or the
rebel  group into  something  more  than  a  simple  loose  confederation  of  organized  ‘self-made’
criminals. It is not by chance that their members, once emotionally and institutionally affiliated to
the organization, have started to: (1) carry out ‘intelligence’ activities typical of a state, such as
those linked to searching and punishing possible spies within the territory under their control; (2)
tax for the passage from one city to another city of any illicit contraband (e.g. drugs, weapons,
laundered cash and people); (3) collect profits, and protect and control the production areas; (4)
recruit and provide subsistence to the marginalized peoples living in underdeveloped regions; and
(5) deliver a range of public services to the population in need (see also Sanger and Davis 2014;
17http://www.save-iraq.info/download/205/ 
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see also the ISIS Files Callimachi 201818). 
In  this  process  of  nation-state  building,  rentierism  has  become  a  complementary
mechanism  of  public  governance  and  state  formation  made  possible  by  the  predation  and
redistribution of natural  resources.  This nation-building process has also required a system of
propaganda that occurs mostly through social networks (Khatib 2015), as well as the construction
of a Weberian bureaucratic structure, necessary to ensure the state fiscal capacity to reduce a ‘state
failure’ and  state  collapse.  In  this  context,  the  creation  of  an  ISIS  organized  rentier  state
represented a further impediment to the process of democratization in Iraq, as it aligned socio-
political  norms  to  the  patrimonial  nature  of  social  interactions  with  associated  more  radical
religiously dominated loyalties (Thies 2015). 
In  order  to  increase  its  acceptance  among  the  population,  ISIS  has  also  invested  in
infrastructures  (such  as  building  underground  pipelines,  employing  engineers,  etc.),  in  public
services and in social benefits. It has also made regular payments to the families of members
killed or captured. It has purchased diesel generators for distributing electricity and mobilized
existing  infrastructures  to  provide  basic  services,  or  engaging  in  agricultural  production  and
taxation (FATF 2015, pp. 29-30). In ISIS-occupied territories, the largest expenditures in salaries
estimated (between $3 million and $10 million every month) were, however, employed for ISIS
police-state institutions, such as committees, media, courts, and market regulation; thus ensuring
Tilly’s  security function  (see Almukhtar  2015).  In  the past,  the access  to  public  services  and
distribution of welfare benefits has depended, for the most part, on non-state and religious actors
(see Gellner 1981; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003). These tasks are now carried out by ISIS
religious leaders. 
As a telling article by Shatz (2015) has demonstrated, the use of public employment in
ISIS-occupied territories has had the unintended consequence of radicalization and social deviance
reinforcement.  Financing  ISIS  has,  for  example,  been  made  possible  by  ISIS  “government”
subsidies  to  “government”  employees  who  lived  in  ISIS-occupied  territories  (wilaya
or ‘protectorates’) (Khatib 2015). This money estimated, as mentioned, in several hundred million
US$ have not only reinforced the local system of patronage and clientelistic relations. They have
also provided additional support for an involuntarily sponsored ISIS administrative local economy
and local war-fare state, reinforcing the ISIS ‘clear, hold, build’ strategy (Khatib 2015; see also
Callimachi 2018)19. 
18 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-
iraq.html
19 According to FATF (2015, p. 30), ‘energy experts estimate that ISIS can rebuild a single mobile
refinery in 10 days for 230,000 USD’. 
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The importance of ISIS in changing cultural patterns in the Iraq public administration must
be  emphasized.  It  involves,  for  example,  not  only a  radicalization  and over-secularization  of
society, but also de-modernization. The increasing number of women who joined the organization
as fighters (and, in case, martyrs) and built a new family (Saltman and Smith 2015) represents
here a notable example of a new societal structure in the making, with associated emerging social
order and social risks. This has a price also for gender-equality. According to FATF (2015, p. 13),
in 2014 ISIS fighters paid for a female slave approximately $13. In 2017, the price had increased
between $35 or $50 (Jones et al. 2017, p. 11). 
ISIS-leaders had become the new “autocratic Leviathans”20 of Iraq.
The Lights of Iraq21
Geographic Information System (GIS) micro and macro econometrics based on near real-time big
data can help to improve understanding of current GDP and GDP growth, or "True GDP" Growth ,
as well as the size of the informal economy (Medina and Schneider 2018). It can also help to
improve understanding of current and future income growth, presence of roads and infrastructures,
wealth of cities, urban versus rural divides, the effects of diseases on growth (such as malaria),
growth at the coast versus the interior, etc. (see Henderson et al. 2012; Donaldson and Storeygard
2016; Leitzell 2012). 
For Leitzell (2012), nighttime lights can be understood as a proxy of economic prosperity
and shining. This is defined as   “the condition of being successful or thriving, especially with
reference to economic well-being”22. Investigating how energy consumption behaviors vary across
different cultural settings, Román and Stokes (2015) have succeeded to shed new light on the
cultural patterns according to which cities and “people illuminate the night”23 and their life (such
as during the Christmas and New Year’s season and the Holy Month of Ramadan). The number
and the intensity of lights is very often associated with the wealth of a city and of a nation (think,
for example, to Berlin, Paris, London or New York night lights). Also geo-spatial data cannot be
so easily falsified by governments. It is, in fact, no secret that politicians and dictators can easily
falsify official GDP statistics for political objectives (see also Martinez 2018). 
The  following  analysis  employs  high-resolution,  remote-sensing  and  satellite  imagery
20 On the autocratic Leviathan and tax competition, see Genschel et al. (2016, p. 27).
21 A more detailed geo-spatial analysis with interactive graphs and images is available at Story
Maps: Geo-Spatial Analysis Iraq https://arcg.is/1uWXrz
22 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prosperity (accessed 19 May 2018). 
23 https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/seeing-holiday-lights-space (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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provided  by  the  NASA Earth  Observatory24.  Remote-sensing  satellite  imagery  are  made  of
millions of single pixels, which become the smallest units of scientific enquiry. NASA nighttime
lights are  derived from the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS)25 sensor on the
SUOMI NPP satellite26 (for an User Guide see especially, NOAA 2017). A special algorithm is
developed to remove remaining clouds' and snow's shades. Data on greenhouse gases are obtained
thanks  to  the  AQUA27,  AURA28 and  TERRA29 satellites  and  derived  from,  respectively,  the
Atmospheric  Infrared  Sounder  (AIRS),  the  Ozone  Monitoring  Instrument  (OMI)  and  the
Moderate-resolution  Imaging  Spectroradiometer  (MODIS)  sensors.  The  validity  of  the  use  of
multi-satellites screening has been confirmed by Román et al. (2018).
Using the SUOMI NPP satellite and VIIRS sensor, Román and Stokes (2015, p. 183) have
also shown that, in the cities of Iraq, war, regional political conflicts and contestation, as well as
civil  conflict  were  determinant  in  changing energy service  supply and demand.  As discussed
by Michael Carlowicz (2016), from 2012 to 2016, Iraq faced differential growth and development
phases  depending on the  previously mentioned economic  transmission  mechanisms,  including
those associated with war-fare amenities.  Until  2016, some areas on the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers and close to Mosul saw some decrease in electricity usage (and therefore of lights and of
prosperity shining),  while areas around Baghdad, Irbil  and Kirkuk saw some more significant
increases because of the temporary improvement of the security situation (see Appendix Fig. 1 and
Fig. 2).  
Over the period 2017-2018, prosperity shining decreased in Baghdad and its surrounding
region, in Irbil, in Mosul and in Kirkuk, as well as in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers more in
general (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, March 9, 2017 to March 31, 2018). This decrease in electricity
usage was the result of the economic recession following the protracted reduction in oil and gas
prices, of war-fare related activities, as well as of ongoing political contestation and civil conflicts
due to the ISIS' presence (OECD 2016a) (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). In the Basrah area, the lack of
production and processing of energy, as well as low voltages and frequency were the main causes
for electricity system instability and reduced prosperity shining (The Baghdad Post 2018c).  
Greenhouse gases (water vapor, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide
and ozone) are responsible for global warming. Both through the slow and fast carbon cycle, they
24 https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/ (accessed 19 May 2018). 
25 https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html (accessed 19 May 2018). 
26 https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/ (accessed 19 May 2018). 
27 https://aqua.nasa.gov/ (accessed 19 May 2018). 
28 https://aura.gsfc.nasa.gov/ (accessed 19 May 2018). 
29 https://www.earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Terra/ (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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contribute to environmental insecurity. Water vapor accounts for about 50 percent, clouds for 25
percent, small particles (such as aerosols) and minor greenhouse gases (e.g. methane and carbon
monoxide)  account for the rest of temperature anomalies (NASA 2011)30.  Greenhouse gases are
not only responsible for global warming and environmental insecurity31, but they can also trigger
asthma attacks, aggravate breathing difficulties and can cause death from respiratory and heart
diseases (Burgess et al. 2007, p.47). 
Whilst the primary contributor to air, land and water pollution in Western Europe is the
transport  sector,  followed by the  industry (see  Burgess  et  al.  2007,  ch.  3,  p.  48),  in  Iraq  oil
pollution  and  the  consequences  of  war-fare  can  be  seen  as  main  causes  for  environmental
insecurity. As portrayed in Figures 6-14, the oil-led state-captured capitalism in Iraq creates not
only  rising  environmental  problems,  but  also  increases,  to  a  larger  extent,  the  asymmetries
between higher levels of economic development, higher levels of air, land and water pollution and
mounting pressures in the labour market and in the war-fare regime architecture (including health
related risks) (see Gough 2013, p. 8; see also Gough 2016, pp. 24-47). This implies implementing
innovative  good  regulatory  practices  in  order  to  meet  emerging  social,  economic  and
environmental challenges. More specifically, Fig. 14 shows aggregate levels of carbon monoxide
and nitrogen oxide, which, as discussed by the NASA Earth Observatory (2018), are both major
air pollutants emitted by cars and by other industrial sources, such as oil and gas plants. The areas
of Basrah, Baghdad, Kirkuk, Irbil and Mosul are the zones where air quality is the poorest. This
can be explained by oil and gas related emissions, as well as by war and conflict related amenities,
such as those related to the fight against ISIS terrorists. 
The  SUOMI  NPP satellite  with  the  VIIRS  sensor  is  also  useful  for  natural  resource
discovery  and  production  (Henderson  et  al.  2012; Donaldson  and  Storeygard  2016).  Using
satellite multi-spectral imaging and ground-truth pre-war-fare output data, Do et al. (2018) have
estimated that in ISIS-occupied territories the terrorist group was able to produce approximately
56,000 barrels per day (bpd) from July-December 2014, which dropped to 35,000 bpd in 2015,
being further reduced to 16,000 bpd in 2016. Assuming an oil price in the black market of 20-45
30 https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/CarbonCycle/?src=features-
hp&eocn=home&eoci=feature_archive&src=share (accessed 19 May 2018). 
31 The  number  of  rare  species  of  breeding  birds  in  the  area  is  an  additional  indicator  of
environmental  quality.  In  Iraq,  there  are  approximately  18  bird  species  at  risk
(http://chartsbin.com/view/40237).  See  List  of  Birds  in  Iraq
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_birds_of_Iraq)  and  Earth  Endangered  Creatures
(http://www.earthsendangered.com/profile.asp?gr=B&sp=4587) (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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USD per barrel, the daily oil related budget available to ISIS should have corresponded to 320,000
USD and 720,000 USD per day. Close to agricultural revenues (see Callimachi 2018), these oil
earnings represented significant sources of funding for new ISIS-sponsored public policies and
social  cooptation  activities.  They  also  resulted  in  new  environmental  challenges  that  were
particularly harmful to the occupied population. 
Electricity Usage and Public Governance
As mentioned (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show), during the period from March 2017 to March 2018,
Baghdad,  and  Iraq  more  in  general,  were  subjected  to  a  decrease  in  electricity  usage  and,
subsequent,  prosperity  shining.  Electricity  infrastructural  damage  reduced  the  availability  of
public services and utilities, which contributed to the post-2018 mass protests elections32. This,
subsequently,  reinforced  extremists'  cooptation  capabilities.  Offices  and  shops  closed.  ISIS
informal  labour  delivery  capacity  and  hidden  social  bondage  activities  increased  (Callimachi
2018).  What should not be forgotten here is that ISIS camps are difficult to target. In Syria, for
example, they are located in open space places with no clear boundaries (Squarcini 2015). Hence,
who hits whom is still an open question.   
The reduction in electricity usage has also resulted in a subsequent reduction in human and
economic activity, as well as in the progress and in the socio-technical advancement of the Iraqi
society33. Re-switching  the lights on (NASA Earth Observatory 2017) has become an important
task  to  accomplish  in  order  to  avoid  recession,  increase  formal  employment  (e.g.  through
entrepreneurship) and GDP, whilst reducing informal economic activites with obvious reduction
of  official  taxes. As  mentioned,  the  Iraqi  oil-led  political  economy  model  is  now  primarily
centered  on  war-fare  debt  damage  consolidation  (the  war  damage  debt refinincing  squeeze
problem), which has reduced the space for fiscal policies.  
Analyzing NASA images, a recent BBC (2017) report has demonstrated that in Syria, in
areas where citizens could turn their lights on at night, they also could get access to life-saving
medical equipment and, hence, this had the potential of improving citizens' lives. The decrease in
electricity usage and night lights in Iraq  from March 2017 to March 2018, especially in ISIS-
occupied territories, has meant that the lives, the access to health facilities, the health and social
32 Al-Jazeera (2018b), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/iraqis-protesting-
180718131316968.html
33 see  OECD  2018  series  Better  Policies  for  Better  Societies available  at
http://www.oecd.org/about/publishing/betterpoliciesseries.htm (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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security of  the citizens  living  in  these places shrunk considerably. Electricity availability and
usage during the period 2017-2018 has played also a determinant role in reducing the access to
water and sanitation facilities, greatly enlarging hygiene's and health risks' factors. 
Despite significant efforts  made by subsequent governments,  the decrease in electricity
usage from March 2017 to March 2018 has also meant a decrease in the availability of school and
educational services. Underage individuals could simply not go to school because of electricty
infrastructural  destruction  or  reduction  in  energy  service  supply  and  demand.  Unfortunately,
problems of education were even more preponderant in ISIS-occupied territories.
Electricity is crucial for keeping public services alive. As electricity usage shrinked from
March  2017  to  March  2018,  the  efficiency  of  public  facilities  with  associated  performance
outcome  shrinked.  The  decrease  in  electricity  usage  also  includes  digital  technology  divides
between war-fare damaged and the non war-fare damaged zones of Iraq. 
Because  of  the  fall  in  electricity  usage  from  March  2017  to  March  2018,  and  the
subsequent increase in the informal economy, women's vulnerabilities have also grown. As noted
by Karshenas and Moghadam (2006), women’s participation in the labour market has often and
unjustifiably been seen by the ruling elites as anti-Islamic (see discussion on women as wives-
mothers above). Even when integration in the labour market has occurred, it has served primarily
to reconfigure state functions and to provide legitimacy to the regime (Krause 2009). Feminization
of poverty has, hence, been the most obvious result,  and this has especially occurred in ISIS-
occupied territories.
Electricity plays a determinant role also in the food production chains. Farms, factories and
machines can be shut off, either by destruction or by electricity disruption. As lights decreased in
Iraq from March 2017 to March 2018,  food production  also decreased.  War damages  do not
improve the food and nutrition situation of the Iraqi population (FAO 2017). In 2018, 2.4 million
Iraqis are still in need of food security assistance (FAO 2018)34, whilst the country continues to be
highly dependent on commercial food imports (Devereux 2017).
Co-optation – broadly understood as 'the capacity of the ruling elite to bind strategic actors
via formal and informal institutions'  (Merkel and Gerschewski 2011, p.1)  –  has shifted also
toward ISIS-leaders as new co-opters (or  war economy profiteers,  see Eaton 2018), who have
aimed at  substituting egalitarian policy participation by ensuring the inclusion of strategically
important radical parts of the population into the economy and into its ultra-confessional politics. 
34 http://www.fao.org/iraq (accessed 19 May 2018). 
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In  order  to  increase  the  electoral  turn-out,  many  parties  started  to  increment  their
investments in public infrastuctures shortly before the 2018 elections (IRIS 2018, p.20). From
April 2018 to May 2018, Iraq faced, as a result, an exponential growth in night light shining (see
Fig. 5). This included not only areas on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, but also Baghdad, Hawija,
Irbil, Kirkuk, Mosul, Ramadi, Tal Afar and the Basrah area. The announced defeat of ISIS, the
temporary improvement of the security situation and the simoultaneuous occurence of the Holy
Month of Ramadan certainly played a role in this growth of prosperity shining,  though social
cooptation activities implemented to increase electoral acceptance should also be mentioned as
key factors for the improvement in the war damage reconstruction and, subsequent, electricity
usage. 
Conclusion
As an important ecosystem (see Parsons and Shils1951), the Iraqi public governance architecture35
has been used as means to ensure polity and policy loyalty (see Hirschman 1970, 1978).  As is
clear  from the  discussion  above, understanding  ISIS'  public  governance  evolutions,  including
processes  of  variation,  as  well  as  the  associated  mechanisms  of  selection  and  replication  of
institutions  and  public  governance  practices  (Lewis  and  Steinmo  2012,  p.  314),  becomes
necessary. 
However, at this stage it is still difficult to locate future Iraqi political and fiscal policies. In
absence  of  a  clear  involvement  of  citizens  in  financing  their  own  system  of  democratic
governance (OECD 2016b), electoral requests become easily a gift of the political, or religious,
elites to ‘their’ citizens (Diamond 2008).  From an analytical point of view, it  seems to be of
interest to emphasize the importance of public integrity (OECD 2017b). But the next obstacle to
good public  governance  concerns  the  introduction of  an  effective tax-financing model,  which
remains an important means for the implementation of de-commodification, de-stratification and
de-clientelization strategies36.
As argued by Eaton (2018, p.2) for the case of Libya's war economy,  a strategy of co-
opting networks of war economy profiteers has often been established. But failures in coercion
capacity have led to administrative, governance and security failures. The same observation holds
true  for positive  incentives which  might  increase  instead  of  decreasing  war-making  and war-
35 On governance Choice Architecture, see Thaler et al. (2014).
36 On  de-commodification, de-stratification and de-clientelization strategies, see Esping-Andersen
(1990) and Gought et al. (2001).
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profiteering activities, if  co-optation activities are characterized by abuse, bad governance and
corruption.  The  profit  margins  of  war  economy beneficiaries  and  militias  must,  however,  be
decreased. Hence, whilst continuing to assure that people are not being exposed to harm, danger
and terror, reconverting the tax finance system to more worthy causes involves a reconversion of
the  central governance architecture. This implies the necessity of ensuring public integrity and
good governance (see OECD 2017a,b) through new tax-farming and tax-steering mechanisms,
which are determinant to avoid state- and policy- capture (see also OECD 2016b). I call this,  the
“taxman approach”.
Financing for a new political economy presupposes, in fact, that funds can be raised not
only through traditional forms of financing, such as direct and indirect taxation, but also through
oil revenues, profits from capital investment, as well as from foreign direct investments, official
donor assistance37, remittances (Cerami and Stubbs 2013), and private-public partnerships. The
establishment  of  a  new  “fiscal  contract”  seems  necessary  also  to  address  the  “dictatorship
dilemma”, according to which dictators or religious Leviathans can foster their acceptance among
the population and electoral representation through new forms of social cooptation (see Genschel
et al. 2016). Considering these circumstances, the available data strongly suggest that the ways in
which “people illuminate the night” (Román and Stokes 2015) and their  life  will  be strongly
correlated to  the positive introduction of  a  new fiscal  contract  and new steering-mechanisms.
However, the new delivery capacity of Iraq's oil-led state-captured capitalism with associated oil-
led state-captured war-fare regime, including its new fiscal contract, should be more seriously
examined.  This  also  implies  taking  into  more  serious  consideration  the  possible  positive
incentives, as well as the creation of unforeseen adverse social bondage activities, which might
cultivate instead of putting an end to ISIS.
37 See OECD (2018). 
https://public.tableau.com/views/AidAtAGlance/DACmembers?:embed=y&:display_count=no
?&:showVizHome=no#1
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